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STUMPING FOR WIDERKER 
Stewart Goetz 
David Widerker has forcefully argued that a libertarian is on firm ground in 
believing that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is true. Eleonore 
Stump has argued that not all libertarians need accept PAP, and that its accep-
tance is not required for a rejection of compatibilism. 
This paper is a defense of Widerker against Stump. I argue that it is not at 
all clear that Stump's view of freedom is libertarian in nature, and that she has 
not provided a good reason for thinking that a libertarian can abandon PAP. 
David Widerker has forcefully argued that a libertarian is on firm ground in 
believing that the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) is true. 
Eleonore Stump has argued that not all libertarians need accept PAP, and 
that its acceptance is not required for a rejection of compatibilism. 
This paper is a defense of Widerker against Stump. I argue that it is not 
at all clear that Stump's view of freedom is libertarian in nature, and that 
she has not provided a good reason for thinking that a libertarian can aban-
don PAP. 
The following is the principle of alternative possibilities: 
PAP: A person is morally responsible for doing an action A, only if he 
could (was free to) have done otherwise than A. 
Harry Frankfurt has stated that PAP has generally seemed so overwhelm-
ingly plausible that some philosophers have regarded it as an a priori truth. l 
He has, however, argued that PAP is false.2 Recently, David Widerker has 
counterargued from a libertarian standpoint that Frankfurtian attacks on 
PAP fail when action A is a mental act of choosing or deciding, and that 
PAP stands unscathed.3 Eleonore Stump has responded to Widerker and 
claimed that not all libertarians need accept PAP, and that its acceptance is 
not necessary for a rejection of compatibilism! 
In this brief paper, I defend Widerker against Stump. I argue both that it 
is not clear that her own view of freedom is libertarian in nature, and that 
she has not given libertarians who believe in and defend PAP a good reason 
to abandon their position. Section I summarizes Widerker's argument and 
Stump's critique of it. Section II explains why I stump for Widerker. 
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I 
Consider the following Frankfurt-style counterexample (FSC) to PAP: 
FSC: Black is a nefarious neurosurgeon. In performing an operation 
on Jones to remove a brain tumor, Black inserts a mechanism into 
Jones' brain which enables Black to monitor and control Jones' activi-
ties. Jones, meanwhile, knows nothing of this. Black exercises his con-
trol through a computer which he has programmed so that, among 
other things, it monitors Jones' voting behavior. If Jones shows an 
inclination to choose to vote for Carter, then the computer through the 
mechanism in Jones' brain intervenes to assure that he actually choos-
es to vote for Reagan and does so vote. But if Jones chooses on his 
own to vote for Reagan, the computer does nothing but continues to 
monitor-without affecting-the goings-on in Jones' head. Suppose 
that in the circumstances Jones chooses to vote for Reagan on his own, 
just as he would have if Black had not inserted the mechanism into his 
head. In this situation, Jones is morally responsible for choosing to 
vote for Reagan, even though he could not have done otherwise.5 
The Frankfurtian conclusion that Jones is morally responsible for choosing to 
vote for Reagan, even though he could not have chosen otherwise, is alleged-
ly correct because in the actual sequence of events the mechanism does not 
operate and Jones chooses to vote for Reagan on his own accord. And the 
Frankfurtian conclusion is allegedly correct, even if the actual sequence pro-
ceeds in an indeterministic way which accords with libertarianism. 
Widerker is not convinced. He asserts that those libertarians who believe 
the following libertarian principle, L, are in the right: 
L: A choice is free only if it is not causally determined.6 
Moreover, contrary to what the Frankfurtian claims, Jones is causally deter-
mined to choose to vote for Reagan in the actual sequence. To clarify why 
this is the case, Widerker maintains that FSC presupposes the following 
principle, or something similar to it: 
PI: Jones' showing an inclination to choose to vote for Carter is in the 
given circumstances a causally necessary condition of his choosing to 
vote for Carter? 
If PI were false, says Wid erker, then Jones would be free to choose to 
vote for Carter without the inclination. With the inclination not being a nec-
essary condition of Jones' choosing to vote for Carter, there would not be 
anything to tip off Black about how Jones would choose, and his mecha-
nism could not operate in time to cause Jones to choose to vote for Reagan. 
If Jones' showing an inclination to choose to vote for Carter is in the given 
circumstances a causally necessary condition of his choosing to vote for 
Carter, then his not showing an inclination in the circumstances is causally 
sufficient for his not choosing to vote for Carter. In the given circumstances, 
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however, there are only two alternatives, namely, either choosing to vote 
for Carter or choosing to vote for Reagan. Therefore, if Jones does not 
choose to vote for Carter, he must choose to vote for Reagan and the latter 
choice is causally determined. But then, L is not satisfied by Jones' choice to 
vote for Reagan. Thus, Jones' choice to vote for Reagan is not free, and 
therefore, he is not morally responsible for making it. In short, a necessary 
condition of FSC's falsifying PAP is that L be false. But to assume the falsity 
of L just begs the question against libertarians, because L is constitutive of 
libertarianism. 
Though Stump acknowledges that Widerker's argument against FSC has 
intuitive appeal, she argues that libertarians need not be moved by it. 
Because they need not be moved by his argument for rejecting FSC, they 
need not defend PAP and can believe, like Frankfurt and his followers, that 
it is false. To support her position, she claims that it is possible to construct 
a revised Frankfurt-style counterexample (RFSC) to PAP where the fictional 
neuroscope detects neural events, and not mental events such as inclina-
tions to choose to vote, which are antecedent to choices. I summarize her 
RFSC as follows: 
RFSC: Grey is a nefarious neurosurgeon who uses a neuroscope sensi-
tive to neuron firings. If neural events x, y, and z occur (call this neur-
al sequence 2) which always precede Jones' choosing to vote for 
Carter, then the neuroscope intervenes to assure that he actually 
chooses to vote for Reagan and does so vote. But if Jones chooses on 
his own to vote for Reagan, where such a choice is always preceded 
by neural events a, b, and c (call this neural sequence 1), the neuro-
scope does nothing but continues to monitor -without affecting-the 
goings-on in Jones' head. Suppose in this circumstance that Jones 
chooses to vote for Reagan on his own, just as he would have if Grey 
had not inserted the neuroscope into his head. In this situation, Jones 
is morally responsible for choosing to vote for Reagan, even though 
he could not have done otherwise.8 
RFSC makes no mention of inclinations and, thus, escapes Widerker's 
argument against FSC. But can't he respond to RFSC with an argument 
similar to the one against FSC? "Yes", answers Stump, because if a libertari-
an is committed to the truth of L, there is an analogue of P, namely, P': 
P': The firing of neural sequence 2 in Jones' brain is in the given cir-
cumstances a causally necessary condition of his choosing to vote for 
Carter." 
Moreover, given the truth of P', it is also true that the nonfiring of neural 
sequence 2 in the given circumstances is causally sufficient for Jones' not 
choosing to vote for Carter, which, given that there are only the two alter-
natives of choosing to vote for Carter and choosing to vote for Reagan, 
entails the occurrence of neural events a, b, and c and Jones' being deter-
mined to choose to vote for Reagan. According to Stump, however, there 
is no reason for a libertarian to be committed to the truth of L. Such a com-
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mitrnent requires that free choices not even be correlated with patterns of 
neural firings in the brain. Maybe Descartes held such a view, but not all 
libertarians need hold it. For example, a non-Cartesian libertarian can 
maintain that a free act (which, in the present example, is Jones' choice) (1) 
is ultimately causally determined by an agent's own mental acts of intellect 
and will of some sort, where these acts are internal to the agent (in the sense 
that they do not originate in a cause outside of Jones-such as Grey's neu-
roscope) and (2) can in some sense be correlated with (e.g., identified with, 
supervenient upon, or emergent from-depending upon your philosophy 
of mind) the relevant neural events a, b, and c (or some other neural events 
which they cause) in Jones' brain.1O What a libertarian of this sort affirms is 
something like L': 
L': A choice is free only if it is not causally determined by a causal 
chain which originates in a cause outside the agent,l1 
Given the truth of L', a libertarian can concede that the occurrence of 
neural events x, y, and z is a causally necessary condition of Jones' choosing 
to vote for Carter such that its failure to occur is causally sufficient for his 
not choosing to vote for Carter and choosing to vote for Reagan. Moreover, 
Grey, via his neuroscope, is able to monitor Jones' brain such that if neural 
events a, b, and c occur, the neuroscope will not intervene to cause Jones to 
choose to vote for Reagan and Jones will choose to vote for Reagan on his 
own. The libertarian can maintain that this choice of Jones is free, even 
though the occurrence of neural events a, b, and c determines its occurrence, 
because the ultimate source of it is internal to him in the form of acts of 
intellect and will. Thus, a libertarian can maintain that Jones is free in RFSC 
and concede the falsity of PAP. 
II 
Has Stump presented a form of libertarianism in light of which PAP can 
reasonably be denied? I believe it is doubtful that she has. In part, this is 
because it is not at all clear that the view of freedom which she proposes is 
libertarian in nature. According to Stump, 
[lJibertarians do need to rule out as nonfree[,] mental acts that are 
causally determined to be what they are by sometizing outside the agent . 
. .. [A] causal chain that originates in some cause external to the agent 
is incompatible with libertarian free will. But the mere claim that a 
free act is the outcome of any causal chain at all is not,'2 
Thus, it is the case on Stump's view that a "free" mental act is determined by 
neural events which are (in some sense) correlated with it and are them-
selves ultimately caused by acts of the intellect and will which are internal to 
the agent. An important question, however, is whether the agent's acts of 
intellect and will are themselves uncaused (not causally determined) by 
other events internal to the agent. Given that the acts of intellect and will 
supposedly constitute the ultimate source of free mental acts, one would 
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think that they are uncaused. Nevertheless, the possibility that they are 
themselves causally determined seems to be left open by (i) the fact that the 
agent's acts of intellect and will are themselves mental events and, thereby, 
must (in some sense) be correlated with neural events, and (ii) Stump's fail-
ure to explicitly reject the view that "all neural events are caused."13 If the 
acts of intellect and will are caused, problems arise for libertarianism. For 
example, on the one hand, if the internal acts of intellect and will which 
cause a free choice are themselves identical with neural events which are 
causally determined by other neural events, then the acts of intellect and will 
would seemingly not be ultimate and the deterministic chain of which they 
are a part would make libertarian freedom impossible. On the other hand, if 
the acts of intellect and will supervene upon or emerge from neural events 
which are causally determined by other neural events, then it would seem 
that the neural events upon which the acts of intellect and will supervene or 
from which they emerge, and not the acts of intellect and will themselves, 
are the ultimate causal source of the free mental act which is causally deter-
mined. In short, it is not clear that the neural story, in so far as it is described 
by Stump as (in some sense) being correlated with mental acts and, thereby, 
acts of intellect and will, is compatible with the truth of libertarianism. 
In written correspondence, Widerker has suggested to me that Stump dis-
associates herself from the view that all neural events are caused. He points 
to a portion of her article in which she claims that a libertarian who accepts 
RFSC must deny that all neural events are caused by something external to 
the agent.14 While Stump does say that not all neural events can be caused 
by something external to the agent, as best as I can ascertain she never explic-
itly repudiates the view that all neural events are caused and, indeed, states 
that there will be little opposition to the view that all of them are caused. J5 
If Stump does believe both that all neural events are caused and that this 
is compatible with libertarianism, one might think that this is because she 
endorses some form of agent-causation, where the neural events which 
determine a free act of choice are ultimately caused by the agent. The prob-
lem with this understanding of Stump's view is that she explicitly maintains 
that a free act of choice is free precisely because the agent's acts of intellect 
and will are its ultimate causal source. Were Stump to espouse the position 
that an act of choice is free because the acts of intellect and will which 
caused it are themselves caused by the agent, the agent-causal activity 
would be ultimate. 
Given the difficulty of reconciling an agent-causationist account of free 
action with Stump's account, perhaps it is implicit in her position that she 
does reject the view that all neural events are caused. This is because, if she 
didn't reject it, she would (in light of her position on the lack of external 
causes of neural events in cases of free action) be committed to the view that 
there is an internal series of caused neural events with no first member. The 
existence of such a series, even though internal, is not only implausible in 
virtue of its infinite nature, but also, and more importantly for present pur-
poses, is incompatible with the truth of libertarianism for reasons already 
mentioned in my evaluation of Stump's failure to explicitly reject the thesis 
that all neural events are caused. 
Therefore, for the sake of discussion, I will concede that Stump believes 
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that not all neural events are caused. More specifically, I will concede that 
those neural events and the acts of intellect and will which are (in some 
sense) correlated with them and which are the ultimate source of the free 
mental act are uncaused. This reading can be supported by a brief discus-
sion where Stump suggests that neural events and the agent's acts of intel-
lect and will which are correlated with them are reasons-responsive. l6 What 
she means by "reasons-responsive" seems to be that agents are able to per-
form acts of intellect and will in response to their reasons, where these rea-
sons are goals or purposes.17 If this is her view, then it is plausibJle to claim 
that all she has done is relocate libertarian freedom from uncaused choices 
which agents make for reasons to prior acts of intellect and will which are 
the ultimate causes of those choices. ls If Stump is advocating the relocation 
of libertarian freedom, then Jones performed acts of intellect and will for 
which there was no sufficient causal condition in the actual sequence. If 
there was no sufficient causal condition for the acts of intellect and will in 
the actual sequence, then Grey could not have been aware of anything neur-
al which would have tipped him off and assured him that Jones would per-
form the acts of intellect and will which would cause the choice to vote for 
Reagan. Thus, Jones was free to do otherwise and perform other acts of 
intellect and will which would have caused his choosing to vote for Carter. 
The only way Grey could have guaranteed the occurrence of the acts of 
intellect and will which would produce a choice to vote for Reagan in the 
actual sequence would have been to trigger the mechanism to cause the 
appropriate acts of intellect and will. Jones' choice, however, would then 
have originated in a cause external to him, and he would not have made it 
on his own. In short, without triggering the mechanism in the actual 
sequence, nothing could have prevented Jones from performing the acts of 
intellect and will which would have led to the free mental act of choosing to 
vote for Carter. Thus, if Stump maintains that there is no sufficient causal 
condition for the acts of intellect and will which led to Jones' choice to vote 
for Reagan, she has not given the libertarian a reason to reject PAP.19 
III 
I conclude that Stump has not refuted Widerker. She has neither pre-
sented a clear libertarian position nor given a libertarian a good reason to 
believe that PAP is false. In light of the overwhelming intuitive plausibility 
of PAP, it is a mistake to abandon it because of Stump's argument.20 
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